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ProbeLabs36 findings · 123 requirements
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Known issueKI-6

unescapeToUTF8Config length guard off-by-one — OOB panic reading in[1] on a lone trailing backslash

OpenOpenHigh

High-severity issue, currently open.

Introduced

When and where this issue first entered the codebase — the commit it traces back to.

Inception (latent from the first version)

Affected requirements

The requirement(s) this issue violates — click through to the spec.

What this means for you

Plain-language impact — what this issue could mean for your users and your system, before any of the technical detail.

A single lone trailing backslash in attacker-controlled JSON crashes the consuming service (denial of service) instead of surfacing a MalformedStringEscapeError. Intentional demo defect on the proof-demo showcase branch; never shipped.

Reachability

Reachable through any Unescape/ParseString/Get* call on attacker-controlled JSON whose string value ends in an unpaired trailing backslash; no special build tags or API options required.

Technical description

unescapeToUTF8Config (escape.go) consumes a backslash escape by reading the escape byte at in[1] after a minimum-length guard. On the proof-demo showcase branch that guard was weakened from `if len(in) < 2` to `if len(in) < 1` (escape.go:194), so a single-byte input `\` passes the check and the escape switch reads in[1] one byte past the end of the slice — a CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read reachable via a lone trailing backslash. The Go runtime converts the read into an index-out-of-range panic, aborting the parse. Intentional demo defect on the proof-demo showcase branch; never shipped.

Severity, explained

Why this is rated the way it is — and the scoring signals behind the rating (each ⓘ explains the term).

HighRated severity — the impact if this issue is exploited or hit.
why this rating
Reproducer-confirmed
risk area
Availability
Security classification
Security-relevant
CVSS
CVSS 7.5· Highv3.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE surface
Likely

Where it is

The code the issue lives in — peek the affected function inline to see it in context.

  • unescapeToUTF8Config

How it's proven

The reproducer — an actual test that drives the real code and shows the issue happening. Run it yourself, or peek the test and the source it covers.

Known issue reproducedprovesSYS-REQ-063
Run it yourself
go test -run TestDemoKI6 -count=1 .
Covers (3)
Last run Aug 3, 2026, 11:00 AM

Reproduction steps

Technical steps for your engineers to confirm the issue by hand.

  1. Check out the proof-demo showcase branch and build the package.
  2. Call jsonparser.GetString on a value that ends in a lone backslash — or run: go test -run TestDemoKI6 -count=1 .
  3. Observe an index-out-of-range panic from unescapeToUTF8Config rather than MalformedStringEscapeError.
go test -run TestDemoKI6 -count=1 .
go test ./... -count=1

How it can be triggered

The input or condition that sets this issue off.

a JSON string value ending in a lone, dangling backslash, e.g. {"k":"\"}

What protects you, and the fix

What limits your exposure today, and the planned remediation.

What protects you now

Bound untrusted input size and recover/validate around parse calls until the length guard is restored; reject strings with dangling escapes before handing them to the parser.

The fix

Restore the 2-byte minimum-length guard in unescapeToUTF8Config (escape.go:194, `if len(in) < 1` -> `if len(in) < 2`) so a lone trailing backslash returns (-1, -1) and the caller surfaces MalformedStringEscapeError. Closes CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read; cf. RFC 8259 section 7.

Blast radius

If you touch this issue, what else may need re-checking — the requirements it affects and the code and tests that hang off them.

Tracing blast radius…

Touch this finding and you re-check 2 requirements · 1 code files · 3 tests.

Requirements (2)
Code files (1)
  • parser.go
Tests (3)
  • deep_spec_test.go
  • mcdc_spec_witnesses_test.go
  • parser_test.go

Per-requirement evidence

For each requirement this finding touches: the implementing code, verifying tests, and proof obligations that discharge it.

Implementing code (1)
  • parser.go
    ParseString
Tests & evidence (3)
  • README.md
  • deep_spec_test.go
  • mcdc_spec_witnesses_test.go
Implementing code (1)
  • parser.go
    ParseString
Tests & evidence (3)
  • README.md
  • mcdc_spec_witnesses_test.go
  • parser_test.go

Evidence trail

The raw evidence manifests behind this finding — superseded by the resolved reproducer above, kept here for traceability.

  • proof/evidence/KI-6-reproducer.yaml

Discussions

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