Proof Portal
Omarchy
ProbeLabsviewing a historical runA proof layer — requirements, tests and verified fixes — for two of Omarchy's subsystems: the application menu (launcher scripts, QML model, JSONC config, search and selection) and the lock screen (lock scripts, QML, PAM authentication). Scope is deliberately limited to those components of omacom/omarchy; the rest of the distribution is not covered.
Exported bash functions execute as root inside apply-lock despite the trusted-PATH replacement
High-severity issue, currently open.
Description
The issue as recorded.
The EUID==0 control (bin/omarchy-apply-lock:15) replaces PATH but leaves the environment intact. Bash imports the exported functions (BASH_FUNC_grep%%, BASH_FUNC_command_not_found_handle%%, ...) into the function table, and function lookup precedes PATH in bash. A caller-supplied grep runs instead of /usr/bin/grep inside the fingerprint gate (line 48). An imported command_not_found_handle returning 0 makes 'if omarchy-shell lock status' (line 62) TRUE with the binary absent (chroot install). Caller-supplied CODE executes with root privileges - the hostile-environment case the PATH pin exists to refuse (SW-REQ-260912-EKJP trusted_path_only) is reachable anyway.
Affected requirements
The requirement(s) this issue violates — click through to the spec.
Severity, explained
Why this is rated the way it is — and the scoring signals behind the rating (each ⓘ explains the term).
- why this rating
- Reproducer-confirmed
- risk area
- Availability
- CVE surface
- None
Where it is
The code the issue lives in — peek the affected function inline to see it in context.
- bin/omarchy-apply-lock (root lock-screen PAM provisioning)
How it's proven
The reproducer — an actual test that drives the real code and shows the issue happening. Run it yourself, or peek the test and the source it covers.
./pocs/crs-260930-g166-c07-c09.sh
Reproduction steps
Technical steps for your engineers to confirm the issue by hand.
./pocs/crs-260930-g166-c07-c09.sh
What protects you, and the fix
What limits your exposure today, and the planned remediation.
What protects you now
sudo env_reset strips exported functions for the non-root arm; the already-root arm (install/upgrade, no sudo) stays exposed
The fix
Unset imported functions before any decision point: eval 'unset -f $(compgen -A function)' under EUID 0. Alternatively run the body via env -i bash --noprofile --norc. Use 'command' for the pinned lookups
Blast radius
If you touch this issue, what else may need re-checking — the requirements it affects and the code and tests that hang off them. Historical view: authored trace links only — automatically derived links aren't reconstructible for past runs.
No authoredcode links reach these requirements in this historical reconstruction. Automatically derived code links aren't reconstructible for past runs, so implementing code may have existed without an authored trace.
Evidence trail
The raw evidence manifests behind this finding — superseded by the resolved reproducer above, kept here for traceability.
Evidence trail
The raw evidence manifests behind this finding — superseded by the resolved reproducer above, kept here for traceability.
- proof/evidence/ki-apply-lock-exported-functions-root.yaml
Change history
Every recorded revision of this finding's source file — when it was added, edited, or re-classified, with the diff for each change.
Discussions
Discuss this with the proof team. Nothing changes in your audit automatically — you open a request and a staff member records any outcome inside the thread.