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Project overview

Omarchy

ProbeLabsviewing a historical run

A proof layer — requirements, tests and verified fixes — for two of Omarchy's subsystems: the application menu (launcher scripts, QML model, JSONC config, search and selection) and the lock screen (lock scripts, QML, PAM authentication). Scope is deliberately limited to those components of omacom/omarchy; the rest of the distribution is not covered.

Viewing historical run 9f3abc1Oct 2, 2026, 12:28 AMquattro-proofBack to current
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Known issueKI-APPLY-LOCK-TARGET-USER-DEGRADES-ROOT

Failed PKEXEC_UID/user mapping silently degrades target_user to root, configuring PAM for the wrong account

OpenOpenMedium

Medium-severity issue, currently open.

Description

The issue as recorded.

target_user resolution (bin/omarchy-apply-lock:18-22) has no pipefail and no abort on a failed getent. With OMARCHY_INSTALL_USER and SUDO_USER unset and PKEXEC_UID unmappable, cut yields the empty string and line 22 falls back to $USER - root under pkexec/env -i. The script then configures the fprintd probe and both PAM files for the wrong account (root unless $USER maps elsewhere). The installing user's lock authentication then stays misconfigured.

Affected requirements

The requirement(s) this issue violates — click through to the spec.

SW-REQ-260912-EKJP

Severity, explained

Why this is rated the way it is — and the scoring signals behind the rating (each ⓘ explains the term).

MediumRated severity — the impact if this issue is exploited or hit.
why this rating
Risk-rated
risk area
Correctness
Security classification
Not a security surface
CVE surface
None

How it's proven

The reproducer — an actual test that drives the real code and shows the issue happening. Run it yourself, or peek the test and the source it covers.

Known issue reproducedprofileknown_issue_reproducerprovesSW-REQ-260912-EKJP
Reproducer test
Run it yourself
./pocs/crs-260930-g166-c05-c06.sh
Covers (2)
Last run Sep 30, 2026, 11:02 PM

Reproduction steps

Technical steps for your engineers to confirm the issue by hand.

./pocs/crs-260930-g166-c05-c06.sh

What protects you, and the fix

What limits your exposure today, and the planned remediation.

What protects you now

callers set OMARCHY_INSTALL_USER explicitly (install scripts do; ad-hoc pkexec callers do not always set it)

The fix

Abort with a diagnostic when the mapping yields an empty target_user instead of falling back to $USER; never configure PAM for uid 0

Blast radius

If you touch this issue, what else may need re-checking — the requirements it affects and the code and tests that hang off them. Historical view: authored trace links only — automatically derived links aren't reconstructible for past runs.

Tracing blast radius…

Touch this finding and you re-check 1 requirements · 1 code files · 1 tests.

Requirements (1)
SW-REQ-260912-EKJP
Code files (1)
  • omarchy-apply-lock
Tests (1)
  • apply-lock-test.sh

Per-requirement evidence

For each requirement this finding touches: the implementing code, verifying tests, and proof obligations that discharge it.

SW-REQ-260912-EKJP
Implementing code (1)
  • bin/omarchy-apply-lock
Tests & evidence (1)
  • test/shell.d/apply-lock-test.sh

Evidence trail

The raw evidence manifests behind this finding — superseded by the resolved reproducer above, kept here for traceability.

  • proof/evidence/ki-apply-lock-target-user-degrades-root.yaml

Change history

Every recorded revision of this finding's source file — when it was added, edited, or re-classified, with the diff for each change.

Discussions

Discuss this with the proof team. Nothing changes in your audit automatically — you open a request and a staff member records any outcome inside the thread.

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