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Project overview

Omarchy

ProbeLabsviewing a historical run

A proof layer — requirements, tests and verified fixes — for two of Omarchy's subsystems: the application menu (launcher scripts, QML model, JSONC config, search and selection) and the lock screen (lock scripts, QML, PAM authentication). Scope is deliberately limited to those components of omacom/omarchy; the rest of the distribution is not covered.

Viewing historical run 033e0d5Oct 2, 2026, 07:36 PMpr/13012Back to current
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Known issueKI-APPLY-LOCK-TARGET-USER-DEGRADES-ROOT

Failed PKEXEC_UID/user mapping silently degrades target_user to root, configuring PAM for the wrong account

OpenOpenMedium

Medium-severity issue, currently open.

Description

The issue as recorded.

target_user resolution (bin/omarchy-apply-lock:18-22) has no pipefail and no abort on a failed getent. With OMARCHY_INSTALL_USER and SUDO_USER unset and PKEXEC_UID unmappable, cut yields the empty string and line 22 falls back to $USER - root under pkexec/env -i. The script then configures the fprintd probe and both PAM files for the wrong account (root unless $USER maps elsewhere). The installing user's lock authentication then stays misconfigured.

Affected requirements

The requirement(s) this issue violates — click through to the spec.

SW-REQ-260912-EKJP

Severity, explained

Why this is rated the way it is — and the scoring signals behind the rating (each ⓘ explains the term).

MediumRated severity — the impact if this issue is exploited or hit.
why this rating
Risk-rated
risk area
Correctness
Security classification
Not a security surface
CVE surface
None

How it's proven

The reproducer — an actual test that drives the real code and shows the issue happening. Run it yourself, or peek the test and the source it covers.

Known issue reproducedprofileknown_issue_reproducerprovesSW-REQ-260912-EKJP
Reproducer test
Run it yourself
./pocs/crs-260930-g166-c05-c06.sh
Covers (2)
Last run Sep 30, 2026, 11:02 PM

Reproduction steps

Technical steps for your engineers to confirm the issue by hand.

./pocs/crs-260930-g166-c05-c06.sh

What protects you, and the fix

What limits your exposure today, and the planned remediation.

What protects you now

callers set OMARCHY_INSTALL_USER explicitly (install scripts do; ad-hoc pkexec callers do not always set it)

The fix

Abort with a diagnostic when the mapping yields an empty target_user instead of falling back to $USER; never configure PAM for uid 0

Blast radius

If you touch this issue, what else may need re-checking — the requirements it affects and the code and tests that hang off them. Historical view: authored trace links only — automatically derived links aren't reconstructible for past runs.

No authoredcode links reach these requirements in this historical reconstruction. Automatically derived code links aren't reconstructible for past runs, so implementing code may have existed without an authored trace.

Tracing blast radius…

Evidence trail

The raw evidence manifests behind this finding — superseded by the resolved reproducer above, kept here for traceability.

  • proof/evidence/ki-apply-lock-target-user-degrades-root.yaml

Change history

Every recorded revision of this finding's source file — when it was added, edited, or re-classified, with the diff for each change.

Discussions

Discuss this with the proof team. Nothing changes in your audit automatically — you open a request and a staff member records any outcome inside the thread.

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