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Project overview

Omarchy

ProbeLabs65 findings · 95 requirements

A proof layer — requirements, tests and verified fixes — for two of Omarchy's subsystems: the application menu (launcher scripts, QML model, JSONC config, search and selection) and the lock screen (lock scripts, QML, PAM authentication). Scope is deliberately limited to those components of omacom/omarchy; the rest of the distribution is not covered.

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ReportR-137GitHub issuePublicDecided· Out of scope

Vendor GPOS SRG V3R3 overlay for an Omarchy stable image

Reported by calledtoconstruct · filed Sep 24, 2026 · open at source

Decided: Out of scope — decided by agents · verified 3 days ago.

At a glance

1 · What is claimed?
Only the report text below — no validator has restated it as checkable claims yet.
2 · What does it affect?
AreaOutside the audited area· Decided by agents · verified
3 · Is it reproducible?
No validation has been run yet.
4 · What remains unclear?
  • Not validated yet: no claims, no reproducer.
5 · What happens next?
Decided by agents and verified by a second, independent agent — see the decision.

Original report

Vendor GPOS SRG V3R3 overlay for an Omarchy stable imagerevision 1 · captured 2026-09-28 21:23 UTC via poll

What this is

Vendor-produced evidence against DISA's General Purpose Operating System Security Requirements Guide, GPOS SRG V3R3 (2025-09-22). The packet uses those V-IDs and marks each row implemented, partial, gap, or not-applicable.

It is not a DISA STIG, not an Arch Linux STIG, and not an authorization to operate. An authorizing official would receive it with an Omarchy stable image. Honest gap rows stay gap rows.

A draft catalog covers the 20 CAT I findings plus V-203599 (session lock, CAT II). Nothing here asks to change the default desktop.

The public image stays the default

Default Omarchy remains the general-purpose system: 5-minute lock, passwordless sudo still available, AUR still available, advisories (when the feed exists) warn and do not block install or update.

Corporate and gov/mil requirements sit on top of that image. They are opt-in presets, not a second distribution.

WhoWhat they run
PublicDefault Omarchy. A missing advisory file is a warning.
CorporateThe same image, plus an opt-in profile: 15-minute lock, passwordless sudo refused, exposure report fails closed when the advisory file is missing or in error.
Gov/milA stable image, plus a restricted package tree copied from stable by allowlist, plus this overlay as the evidence packet.

The restricted tree is not a fourth edge → rc → stable stage. Sites that want it point at that tree. Everyone else keeps the normal repositories.

What a profile can close, and what it cannot

Settings already in the product can be tightened by the opt-in profile: lock timer (V-203599) and passwordless sudo (the default-desktop half of V-203695).

These CAT I rows stay gaps until someone asks for an install-time preset. A profile applied after install cannot honestly close them:

  • V-203776 / V-203739 — FIPS-validated and NSA-approved cryptography
  • V-203782 — unattended or automatic logon (the ISO creates an autologin session)
  • V-203682 — cryptographic protection of audit tools (no STIG-complete auditd ruleset)
  • V-252688 — wireless peripheral crypto policy

V-203720 (signed patches) is partial: Arch and OPR packages are signed, the AUR is not. The close is the restricted allowlist, not removing the AUR from the public image.

The one row that needs the OPR advisory feed

V-259333 (install security-relevant updates within 30 days) needs the per-artifact advisory files from omacom/omarchy-pkgs#378, plus Arch's own audit data. A missing advisory file is "no evidence," not a claim that the package is clean. The other overlay rows are desktop and installer behavior, not package CVE metadata.

Ask

Does this evidence packet belong in docs/compliance/ on an Omarchy stable image, with the public defaults unchanged? Pull requests for the overlay, the opt-in profile, and the restricted package tree should wait on that answer.

View raw text
## What this is

Vendor-produced evidence against DISA's General Purpose Operating System Security Requirements Guide, [GPOS SRG V3R3](https://www.cyber.mil) (2025-09-22). The packet uses those V-IDs and marks each row `implemented`, `partial`, `gap`, or `not-applicable`.

It is not a DISA STIG, not an Arch Linux STIG, and not an authorization to operate. An authorizing official would receive it with an Omarchy **stable** image. Honest gap rows stay gap rows.

A draft catalog covers the 20 CAT I findings plus V-203599 (session lock, CAT II). Nothing here asks to change the default desktop.

## The public image stays the default

Default Omarchy remains the general-purpose system: 5-minute lock, passwordless sudo still available, AUR still available, advisories (when the feed exists) warn and do not block install or update.

Corporate and gov/mil requirements sit on top of that image. They are opt-in presets, not a second distribution.

| Who | What they run |
| --- | --- |
| Public | Default Omarchy. A missing advisory file is a warning. |
| Corporate | The same image, plus an opt-in profile: 15-minute lock, passwordless sudo refused, exposure report fails closed when the advisory file is missing or in error. |
| Gov/mil | A stable image, plus a restricted package tree copied from stable by allowlist, plus this overlay as the evidence packet. |

The restricted tree is not a fourth edge → rc → stable stage. Sites that want it point at that tree. Everyone else keeps the normal repositories.

## What a profile can close, and what it cannot

Settings already in the product can be tightened by the opt-in profile: lock timer (V-203599) and passwordless sudo (the default-desktop half of V-203695).

These CAT I rows stay gaps until someone asks for an install-time preset. A profile applied after install cannot honestly close them:

- V-203776 / V-203739 — FIPS-validated and NSA-approved cryptography
- V-203782 — unattended or automatic logon (the ISO creates an autologin session)
- V-203682 — cryptographic protection of audit tools (no STIG-complete auditd ruleset)
- V-252688 — wireless peripheral crypto policy

V-203720 (signed patches) is partial: Arch and OPR packages are signed, the AUR is not. The close is the restricted allowlist, not removing the AUR from the public image.

## The one row that needs the OPR advisory feed

V-259333 (install security-relevant updates within 30 days) needs the per-artifact advisory files from omacom/omarchy-pkgs#378, plus Arch's own audit data. A missing advisory file is "no evidence," not a claim that the package is clean. The other overlay rows are desktop and installer behavior, not package CVE metadata.

## Ask

Does this evidence packet belong in `docs/compliance/` on an Omarchy stable image, with the public defaults unchanged? Pull requests for the overlay, the opt-in profile, and the restricted package tree should wait on that answer.

Validation

Not checked yet. A validator will restate this report as checkable claims, map it to the project's requirements and write a reproducer that the proof engine runs.

Linked

Not linked to any known issue, other report or change yet.

Decision

Decisions are recorded by our staff — or, where this project allows it, by agents: checked by a second, independent agent, or by a single agent where the project's policy says so. Any decision reached so far is shown below.

  • Out of scopeDecided by agents · verified · 2026-10-09 17:56 UTC